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6.1 Background
The food price crisis of 2007–2008 saw a steep rise in food prices, which brought
food security to the forefront of global attention. In June 2010, food prices started
rising again; between June 2010 and May 2011, the international prices of maize
and wheat roughly doubled. Food prices peaked in February 2011. According to
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the spike in
2011 was even more pronounced than in 2008 (see, for example, the evolution of
maize prices in Fig. 6.1, which exceeded the levels of prices in 2008 even when
adjusted for inflation). Moreover, recent increases in price volatility are not in line
with historical data (dating back to the late 1950s) and have particularly affected
wheat and maize in recent years. For soft wheat (used for cakes and pastries), for
example, there were 207 days of excessive price volatility between December 2001
and December 2006 (an average of 41 days a year), whereas there were 395 days
of excessive price volatility between January 2007 and June 2011 (an average of 88
days a year), as shown in Fig. 6.2.
The 2007–2008 food price crisis led to economic difficulties, particularly for
the already poor population. Despite the varying level of price transmission from
international to local markets among regions, it generated social and political
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Corn Hard Wheat Rice Soybeans Crude Oil
Fig. 6.1 Inflation-adjusted prices of agricultural commodities and oil, 1990–2011 (weekly data).
Note: corn is U.S. no. 2 yellow, wheat is U.S. no. 2 hard red winter, rice is white Thai A1 super,
soybeans is U.S. no. 1 yellow, and crude oil is spot price from Cushing, Oklahoma WTI. Source:
FAOSTAT Online, Grain Council, and U.S. Energy Information Administration
turmoil in many countries. In addition, food price spikes and excessive volatility
worsened the problem of hunger by increasing poverty (see Chap. 1 of this book
for a detailed review of the nutritional impacts). The effects of high and volatile
food prices are also particularly harmful for countries with high net food imports,
and high food inflation affects countries with large numbers of poor people, such as
China, India, and Indonesia.
As long-term solutions to the food price crisis are sought, it is important to
understand the root causes of the problem. The crisis was triggered by a complex set
of long- and short-term factors, including policy failures and market overreactions.
In this respect, Table 6.1 shows a more complete discussion of the different demand-
and supply-side factors that contributed to the 2007–2008 food price crisis.
As shown in Table 6.1, outside of traditional fundamentals, an important factor
contributing to the crisis may have been the entry of significant financial resources
into futures markets, including food commodity markets. This large financial inflow
of resources may have contributed to a price spike during the first 6 months of
2008 and also later in 2010. It is important to note that there is no consensus
among experts on this; there is, however, significant discussion surrounding the
possibility that channeling financial resources through commodity futures markets,
by speculators in particular, may have triggered the food crisis. Establishing
theoretical and empirical linkages between future prices and spot prices is not easy,
and testing causality is even more complex (for the theory on the topic, see Sanders
and Irwin 2010 and see Chap. 1 for a detailed discussion).
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Fig. 6.2 Excessive food price volatility for hard wheat. Note: This figure shows the results of
a model of the dynamic evolution of daily returns based on historical data going back to 1954
(known as the Nonparametric Extreme Quantile (NEXQ) Model). This model is then combined
with extreme value theory to estimate higher-order quantiles of the return series, allowing for
classification of any particular realized return (that is, effective return in the futures market) as
extremely high or not. The blue line is a logarithm of the observed daily return (rate of increase
of prices from 1 day to the other) on investment. The red line represents a level below which
returns have a 95 % probability of occurring (i.e., the higher-order return estimated by the NEXQ
model). When the blue line (return) exceeds the red line (95th percentile), it is characterized as an
excessively large return. One or two such returns do not necessarily indicate a period of excessive
volatility. Periods of excessive volatility are identified based on a statistical test applied to the
number of times the extreme value occurs in a window of consecutive 60 days. Source: Martins-
Filho et al. (2010). See details at http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/soft-wheat-price-volatility-
alert-mechanism
Today’s agricultural markets have three key characteristics that increase price
responses to any of the drivers behind the causes of rising prices and volatility. First,
export markets for all staple commodities—rice, maize, wheat, and soybeans—are
highly concentrated in a few countries or very thin (that is, only a small share of
production is traded). In the case of both maize and rice, the top five producers
account for more than 70 % of global production, and the top five exporters account
for about 80 % of world exports. For wheat, the top five producers and exporters
account for about 50 and 60 % of global production and exports, respectively.
These high levels of concentration imply that the world’s capacity in coping with
geographical risk is limited. Any weather shocks or exogenous shocks to production
in these countries will immediately have an effect on global prices and price
volatility. Second, the world’s maize reserves and restricted wheat reserves are now
at historically low levels. To function effectively, the market requires a minimum
level of grain reserves to serve as a buffer against sudden changes in supply or









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are not very responsive to price changes in the short term. When prices go up, for
example, it is difficult for farmers to immediately produce more or for consumers to
immediately consume less. As a result, any supply shocks, caused by events such as
a drought or flood, can lead to price spikes and hoarding by farmers seeking to take
advantage of higher prices in the future. In both 1973 and 2007, global grain stocks
hit record lows, prompting the global food crises. Insufficient stocks can lead to
large price increases and a breakdown of functioning markets. In 2007–2008, grain
stocks were only about 60 million tons (2.7 % of global production) lower than in
2004–2005. But as evident in prices rising sharply in 2007–2008, this difference
in grain stocks was enough to cause serious problems in the market, especially for
commodities whose production is concentrated in just a few countries, such as rice
(Timmer 2010). Third, appropriate, timely information on food production, stock
levels, and price forecasting is sorely lacking. When this information gap leads to
overreactions by policymakers and traders, it could result in soaring prices.
In summary, despite the recent literature regarding the potential causes of the
2007–2008 and 2010 crises, we do not yet have a definitive causal diagnosis that
analyzes all the potential causes on a quantitative basis. As a result, it is even more
difficult to analyze the potential policies that are necessary to avoid such a crisis in
the near and long-term future. However, the general consensus is that this episode
and what has been happening since October 2010 highlight the need for more
research into the architecture of international financial and agricultural markets so
that we can identify proper mechanisms for reducing price spikes and extreme price
volatility, especially given the extreme impacts they have on the livelihoods of the
poor (Sommer and Gilbert 2006; Bakary 2008; Brahmbhatt and Christiaensen 2008;
OECD 2008; UNCTAD 2009; von Braun 2008a–c; von Braun et al. 2008; World
Agricultural Outlook Board 2008; Headey and Fan 2010; HM Government 2010).
The new global reality involves both higher and more volatile prices—two
different conditions with distinct implications for consumers and producers. For
several decades, the dominant approach to managing food price volatility has been
to stabilize income without affecting prices. The idea behind this approach is that
prices guide behavior, so any attempt to change prices damages this mechanism
of resource allocation. At the same time, the “natural” insurance that comes from
the negative correlation between harvest size and price level stabilizes producers’
incomes—in particular in closed economies. Thus, any effort to stabilize food prices
reduces the correlation between prices and harvests and disrupts the existing natural
equilibrium. Under this strategy, private insurance and hedging instruments, along
with public instruments targeting vulnerable households, are used to manage risk
and stabilize prices. However, in the changing global economy, local prices are
becoming less correlated to local harvests, and prices do not always convey the
appropriate information to economic agents. Mechanisms to reduce excessive price
volatility then become essential in eliminating the endogenous component of price
instability without affecting the natural price instability component.1
1For more information, see Galtier (2009).
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In the short term, both the supply of and demand for grain are very inelastic.
Droughts, floods, or any other severe weather shocks can have significant impact
on country-level supply because grain production is so sensitive to weather events.
Combined with demand inelasticity, any supply shocks can lead to price spikes
and hoarding behavior by farmers trying to take advantage of higher prices in the
future. At a regional level, on the other hand, grain production is less affected by
weather, and shortages in production in certain areas can be compensated for by
higher production in other areas. As a result, international trade can reduce the
need for large national-level grain reserves. However, because so many countries
had reduced their public grain reserves by 2007, when prices began to rise, many
governments had no mechanism for stabilizing their grain markets. A few countries
did have sufficient reserves but did not want to sacrifice those reserves to stabilize
the global market. Governments in a few exporting countries further worsened the
situation by temporarily establishing export barriers and reducing import barriers;
thus, by adding upward pressure on commodity markets, global market stability was
sacrificed in order to stabilize domestic prices.
Variable temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, and increased occur-
rence of extreme weather events brought about by climate change, such as droughts
and floods, will increasingly affect the global food supply. As a result, the global
community will have to increasingly deal with the issues prompted by the food
price and financial crises of recent years as prices are increasingly affected by both
supply and demand issues around the world. From these crises, it is evident that
governments will find it difficult to deal with these issues at a national level.
A careful analysis of the different policies that could be implemented to reduce
or diminish the effects of increasing price volatility, and especially to reduce the
probability of significant price spikes, is therefore necessary. The price spike episode
of early 2008 clearly highlighted the need to modify the institutional architecture
of international financial and agricultural markets to address their effects on the
livelihoods of the poor. This chapter reviews the most prominent policy proposals
aimed at reforming international agricultural markets and addressing price volatility
at the international scale.
6.2 Review of Policies Proposed/Implemented to Reduce Price
Volatility Before 2007
Physical reserves have been used at national, regional, and international level
at different times throughout history to control price spikes and reduce price
variability. For decades, large countries, such as China and India have kept a
significant level of physical reserves because of their size and the effects that their
entry into world markets would have on prices during harvest shortfalls. The US
operated a farmer-owned reserve for several decades. The farmers received loans
and money as reimbursement for their storage costs; in exchange, they were required
to follow stipulations concerning when the stored grain could be sold. The farm bill
passed in 1996; however, it virtually eliminated physical grain reserves.
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Many African countries, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Niger,
Ethiopia, and Tanzania, established national-based food security reserve stocks
between 1975 and 1980. During the time, agriculture was heavily managed, and
because global grain prices were extremely high, many of these governments did
not trust world markets to be secure sources of grain during an emergency. However,
it proved to be quite difficult to accurately estimate how much grain was actually
needed in these reserves. There was a tendency to overestimate the amount of
grain needed in an emergency (Rashid and Lemma 2010). Quantities were based
on estimates of normal consumption; in reality, however, people facing hunger
eat less and often switch to cheaper foods, which then make up some of the
shortfall. There were a number of other difficulties which eventually led to the
disappearance of these food security reserve stocks in most countries, including
the use of the reserves in normal market operations by the parastatals, insufficient
resources to replenish reserves, and the unwillingness of donors to support these
activities. Interest in the establishment of strategic grain reserves was revived
following the liberalization of the cereal markets during the structural adjustment
of the 1990s. Governments attempted to insure against the failure of the private
sector during this period, but many of the experiences in managing these reserves
were similar to previous attempts at operating grain reserves. Mismanagement,
corruption, damaged donor relations, and erroneous estimates of consumption and
production plagued governments as they tried to manage these reserves.
Interest in regional reserves also increased after the last food price spike in 1973–
1974. The FAO (1980) noted the establishment of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Food Security Reserve (which was never operational)
and also a proposal by CILSS (Inter-State Committee on Drought in the Sahel) to
establish a regional reserve in the Sahel. The FAO provided technical assistance
to support these initiatives. The idea of creating a regional food reserve for
Mediterranean countries was also put forward, but it was not until the recent
food crises that the ASEAN initiative was reactivated. To ensure food security in
the region, ASEAN has established various cooperation programs, one of which
is the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR). The EAERR is a regional
cooperation program between the ten ASEAN member states, China, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea. Specifically, it is an initiative of the ASEAN Ministers
on Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministers of Agriculture of the People’s
Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (AMAF Plus Three) to provide
food assistance, strengthen food security in emergencies caused by disasters, and
alleviate poverty. The EAERR is therefore a mutual assistance system through
which rice stocks are shared between the 13 countries. It also aims to contribute to
price stability of rice in the region (Chap. 17 by Irfan Mujahid and Lukas Kornher
estimate the benefits of the EAERR through risk pooling). The EAERR plans to
develop a proposal to upgrade the pilot project to a full-fledged scheme among the
ASEAN Plus Three countries. The ASEAN Plus Three Agreement on Emergency
Rice Reserve is currently being drafted for this purpose. However, the realization of
a permanent scheme is subject to internal consultation, further assessment, and the
evaluation of the outcomes of the pilot project. For a mechanism like the EAERR
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to work, political support from the ASEAN Plus Three countries is necessary. The
EAERR pilot project is closely related to the ASEAN Food Security Information
System (AFSIS) project and the work of the ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board
(AFSRB)2 in establishing food security in the region.
International commodity agreements (ICAs) (see Gilbert 1987, 1996) were
established to stabilize individual commodity prices at the global level after the
Second World War. However, most of these agreements collapsed, and by the early
1960s, only the agreements for wheat, sugar, coffee, tin, and olive oil remained.
Although opinions differ as to why these agreements were not successful, the ICAs
mostly played a peripheral role in stabilizing prices. The ICA on rubber actually
had procedures to deal with increases and decreases in its price bands, but because
it followed market prices for the most part, it was only able to smooth, not stabilize,
prices. The cocoa and sugar agreements were simply too weak to accomplish their
objectives, while the tin agreement was trying to hold prices at levels which were too
high without the necessary financial backing. The agreement on coffee was arguably
the most successful in raising and stabilizing prices before it lost consumer support
and collapsed. Although some of the governing bodies of the ICAs still exist,3 these
days they mostly assist the respective industries by publishing relevant statistics and
studies rather than stabilizing prices.
Price stability and a stable supply of wheat were maintained during the early
years of the International Grains Council (previously the International Wheat
Council). However, this is most likely due to the relative stability of the supply
and demand during this time; the agreements broke down during the 1973–1974
food crisis. Prompted by the price shock, international interest in grain reserves
was reignited, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) organized discussions on the possibility of establishing international
grain reserves (Wright and Bobenrieth 2009). The idea was to hold stocks nationally
while managing them internationally, but issues of trigger price levels, stock
levels and contributions, and special provisions for developing countries caused the
discussions to fail, and the proposed international grain reserve was not established.
6.3 Review of Policies Proposed as a Result of the 2007–2008
and 2010 Food Price Crises
Following the food price crisis of 2007–2008 and the events since October 2010,
there have been numerous proposals aimed at preventing such events from occurring
again. The proposed plans address a range of ideas for improvement, including
2The AFSRB is an ASEAN mechanism for sharing of rice stocks in times of shortage, particularly
through the trigger of a collective operation of the committed ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve
(AERR). Currently, the total quantity of the AERR is 87,000 metric tonnes for emergency
purposes.
3Coffee (ICO); cocoa (ICCO); cereals, oilseeds (IGC); sugar (ISO); jute (IJSG); rubber (IRSG);
bamboo, rattan (INBAR); tropical timber (ITTO); cotton (ICAC); olives, olive oil (IOOC).
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physical reserves at different levels, virtual reserves, improvements in information
and coordination, and trade facilitation. Several proposals have been made for
storage: emergency reserves for food aid, internationally coordinated public grain
reserves, and national and regional stocks. More than ten proposals have been put
forward with the aim of preventing price spikes and price volatility in the future.
These proposals can be grouped as follows: (a) information and research, (b) trade
facilitation, (c) reserves and stocks, (d) financial instruments, and (e) regulatory
proposals.
6.3.1 Information
There are two key proposals for improving information and coordination in order
to increase market confidence and relieve temporary disruptions in supply. First,
Wright (2008, 2009) and Evans (2009) proposed an international food agency (IFA);
second, Martins-Filho et al. (2010) proposed an early warning mechanism (EWM)
to identify price abnormalities.
Wright (2009) argued that confidence in markets could be increased if there
were more and better information regarding stocks. Similarly, Evans (2009) and
Wright (2008) proposed the creation of an IFA, modeled after the International
Energy Agency (IEA),4 which would report on stock levels and develop protocols
for international collaboration to improve the global response to shortages and
help prevent the onset of market panic. Two potential criticisms are central to
this proposal. First, many international agencies are not optimistic that better
information regarding existing stocks and their evolution can be generated without
considerable effort, international coordination, and costs. This is even more relevant
given the current lack of appropriate information regarding public holding of stocks
by key producer countries such as China and India; there are also much stocks held
by private enterprises which consider their stock levels as commercial secrets. The
lack of appropriate information on and knowledge of the holders and the type of
stocks at a given time calls into question the development of the IFA as proposed
by Evans (2009). Second, it is unclear how emergency response protocols could
be agreed upon at such levels of asymmetry of information or which mechanisms
would be used to identify critical levels of stocks which would necessitate the IFA
to call for a collaborative international response. Resolving both of these problems
could be extremely costly, although the availability of information on physical
stocks at the global level could by itself help to reduce price volatility.
4The IEA was established in 1974 in the wake of that commodities spike. It reports on public and
private petroleum stocks in OECD member states and has developed protocols for international
collaboration in assuring supplies reach a member country should there be a disruption to their
import market (Wiggins and Keats 2009a, b).
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Martins-Filho et al. (2010)5 proposed a model for estimating conditional quan-
tiles for log returns of future prices (contracts expiring between 1 and 3 months)
of hard wheat, soft wheat, corn, and soybeans. This fully nonparametric model
identifies the cases in which the values of the realized returns (log returns of future
prices contracts expiring between 1 and 3 months) are higher than the forecast
95 % conditional quantile for the log return on the following day based on a model
that includes daily returns since 2001. When this event happens, it means that the
realized return is an abnormality, and we expect it to fall under the 95th percentile
return on the following day. This additional market information could in itself
help to reduce potential asymmetry of information among buyers and sellers and
therefore helping to reduce extreme price volatility. One main caveat of the model
is that it is currently operating only for commodities traded in the futures market,
but the framework can also be extended to spot markets if better price information
existed.
The G20 has clearly understood the need for better information and has agreed
to launch the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) to encourage major
players in the global agrifood market to share data, enhance existing information
systems, promote greater understanding of food price developments, and advance
policy dialogue and cooperation. AMIS, in a way, captures both of the proposals
explained before. If properly linked to existing global, regional, or national early
warning systems for food security and vulnerability, AMIS could substantially
improve countries’ capacity to make appropriate decisions regarding food security
matters and help reduce price volatility. However, as the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter (2010), has already pointed out, without
the full participation of the private sector, the information will be incomplete. So
far, private companies are merely urged to participate in AMIS. Support should
be provided to build national and regional capacity to develop and implement
transparent and publicly accessible food security monitoring and information
systems.
6.3.2 Trade Facilitation
Other proposals aim to facilitate trade in order to reduce risks in grain trading when
supplies are low and to avoid disruptions in grain market. Sarris (2009) proposed
a type of food import financing facility (FIFF) that would alleviate financing
constraints as well as an International Grain Clearinghouse Arrangement (IGCA)
to ensure the availability of staple food imports. This international clearing house
would reduce the risk of exporters reneging on contracts when supplies are tight by
guaranteeing contracts for grain deliveries. Finally, Wright (2009) and Lin (2008)
5For further details see http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/sites/default/files/Martins-
FilhoToreroYao2010.pdf
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took a different approach to trade facilitation (TF) with plans to prevent export bans
in order to avoid any disruption of supplies.
The FIFF was initially proposed to the IMF in the early 1980s by the World Food
Council and the FAO, and it was implemented in May 1981, although as mentioned
it raised several questions about its possible effect on world grain prices. The facility
could create a significant increase in demand for grains in developing countries in
years of tight supply and thus could put strong upward pressure on prices. Moreover,
despite its existence, the facility has not been used in the last 10 years, not even
during the 2007–2008 crisis. According to Shaw (2007), “terms for accessing the
facility were set too high to make it attractive or acceptable.” When countries have
existing balance of payment weaknesses, they cannot access the FIFF without a
parallel fund-supported adjustment program. If this facility is to be used more as a
humanitarian instrument as a result of the price crises, it clearly seems to be targeting
more on emergency situations rather than directly on reducing price volatility. In
addition, the facility is susceptible to significant governance problems and costs,
and it would be necessary to develop an independent FIFF without IMF-attached
conditionalities (for further details, see Huddleston et al. 1984; Valdés 1981; Adams
1983).
On the other hand, the IGCA proposal, as mentioned by Wiggins and Keats
(2009a, b), looks somewhat similar to the International Commodity Clearing House
(ICCH) proposed in 1949. Wiggins and Keats pointed out that at that time, the
world food situation was characterized by commodity surpluses in areas with strong
currencies (particularly the US dollar), while countries with weaker currencies and
insufficient supplies could not afford imports. This led to the ICCH proposal: a
public corporation to be housed in the FAO with a budget of US$5 billion. The initial
proposal covered half a dozen main functions, which included the coordination and
negotiation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, but given its complexity
and the requirement need to transfer power to multilateral organizations, it was
rejected by FAO member nations.
In the current revision of the IGCA proposal, as explained by Wiggins and
Keats (2009a, b), grain trade contracts (between countries or private entities) in
the medium- and long-term would be guaranteed. It would be housed in an existing
institution, such as an international bank or multilateral financial institution, and
would function as a holding body for a “good faith margin” contributed by the buyer
and the seller in any particular contract. These amounts, posted as margins, could
be borrowed from international banks or other multilateral financial institutions.
To guarantee availability of physical supplies, the IGCA would invest its financial
reserves in physical stocks of grain in locations of excess supply or in the form of
futures contracts in organized commodity exchanges. Any commitments in futures
taken out as insurance on a particular contract could be liquidated upon execution
(physical delivery between buyers and sellers) of said contract.
As in the initial proposal, and in addition to the governance issues, the key
questions are: how large would these margins have to be, and who would invest
in them? Will it require international support? If so, how will this be coordinated,
especially during times of tight global supply? In addition, it poses two more
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key problems: first, the need to have a global storage mechanism in place and
its necessary international governance; second, the need to specify any triggering
mechanism that will make it effective, i.e., when the grain guarantee would be
executed.
Finally, in the case of Wright (2009) and Lin’s (2008) proposal, the most difficult
part would clearly be persuading countries to commit to the IGCA and then adhere
to it during a food crisis. When facing the choice between breaking international
agreements and protecting their citizens by ensuring national food security, some
countries are likely to impose export bans, regardless of any punitive actions against
protective trade policies. Moreover, as shown by Martin and Anderson (2010),
and Bouet and Laborde (2009), if export taxes are raised in a large agricultural-
based economy, world food prices will rise (through a reduction in world supply),
which will hurt small net food-importing countries. The reduction of import duties
has exactly the same effect: an increase in world prices through an expansion of
demand in world markets. Furthermore, when export taxes are augmented in large
food-exporting countries and import duties are reduced in large food-importing
countries, small food-importing countries would be affected economically; thus,
the solution is not only a facilitation of trade but also the understanding of the
effects of different trade policies could have and to understand the importance of the
required governance to prevent large countries from implementing policies aimed at
maintaining constant domestic food prices. The costs of insufficient cooperation in
and regulation of (binding process) such policies in a time of crisis is an extremely
complex issue, and it is unclear whether the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms
could be used effectively (see also Chap. 8 of this book by Bouët and Laborde).
6.3.3 Reserves and Stocks
There have been several proposals regarding physical reserves: (1) emergency
reserves (ERs) (von Braun and Torero 2008); (2) international coordinated grain
reserves (ICGRs) (Lin 2008; von Braun et al. 2009) and rice reserves (Timmer
2010); (3) regional reserves (RRs) by regional associations of governments; and (4)
country-level reserves (CRs) by multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank.
The ERs is a modest emergency reserve of around 300,000–500,000 metric tons
of basic grains—about 5 % of the current food aid flows of 6.7 million wheat-
equivalent metric tons—which would be supplied by the main grain-producing
countries and funded by a group of countries participating in the scheme. These
countries would include the Group of Eight Plus Five (G8C5) countries (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the US, Brazil, China, India, Mexico,
and South Africa) and perhaps other countries. This decentralized reserve would
be located at strategic points near or in major developing country regions and
make use of existing national storage facilities. The reserve, which would be used
exclusively for emergency response and humanitarian assistance, would be managed
by the World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP would have access to the grains
at precrisis market prices to reduce the need for short-term ad hoc fundraising. To
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cover the cost of restoring the reserve to its initial level (i.e., the difference between
the post and precrisis price multiplied by the quantity of reserves used by WFP),
an emergency fund should be created, and its level maintained by the participating
countries. The fund should be accompanied by a financing facility that the WFP
could draw from as needed to cope with any potential increase in transport costs, as
experienced in the 2008 crisis. This arrangement could also be defined under a newly
designed Food Aid Convention. It should be solely for humanitarian purposes rather
than the reduction of excessive price volatility. Following this initiative, the G20
has proposed studying the feasibility of a global humanitarian emergency reserve
through a pilot implementation in West Africa under the leadership of ECOWAS
and the support of the WFP.
The other three mechanisms had been proposed as ways to mitigate excessive
price volatility. A combination of the proposed reserve systems would likely be
necessary, but country-level reserves should be thought of as a strategic reserve
rather than food stock held by marketing board/parastatals. Enforcing floor and
ceiling prices by marketing boards or parastatals has always involved holding phys-
ical stocks of grains; there is significant evidence that these measures would distort
markets (Rashid and Lemma 2010). Strategic grain reserves are different from such
stocks. Strategic reserves were introduced in many countries because marketing
boards failed to address shocks, such as the prolonged droughts in the countries
of the Sahel region; however, they cannot be thought of as mechanisms to reduce
international price volatility. Moreover, three key challenges arise when maintaining
these types of strategic reserves: the determination of optimum stock levels, the level
of costs and losses associated with these reserves, and the uncertainties that strategic
reserves could cause in the market place. Not only is the process of determining
optimum stock levels politically challenging, but reserves are also highly dependent
on transparent and accountable governance. In addition, predicting supply, demand,
and potential market shortfalls can be extremely difficult. Physical reserves also
require financial resources and must be rotated regularly; in African countries, the
costs of holding a metric ton of food ranged from US$20 to US$46 (Rashid and
Lemma 2010). The countries that need reserves most are generally those which are
least able to afford the costs and oversight necessary for maintaining them. The
private sector is better financed and better informed and has more political power,
which puts it in a much better position to compete than most of the governments that
would be managing these reserves. Finally, the uncertainties that strategic reserves
can introduce into the marketplace can be problematic.
With respect to the coordination of global reserves and regional reserves, in
addition to high storage costs (both opportunity and effective costs when creating a
new physical reserve) and the fact that the creation of reserves will put more upward
pressure on prices during times of tight supply, there are several other concerns that
need to be taken into account. First, similar to the security provisions of the IEA,
the key challenge would be to develop a governance structure such that member
countries would honor their commitments to the reserves even when markets are
under stress. Second, the global or regional reserves would clearly require trigger
mechanisms to determine when to release stocks to calm markets in times of stress.
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Such mechanisms are a necessary condition for a reserve to operate as a tool to
reduce extreme price volatility. In addition, it is imperative to keep the trigger
mechanisms highly transparent. The model proposed by Martins-Filho et al. (2010)
could be a solution to address the need for transparency. Finally, a physical reserve,
whether regional or global, would not resolve the problem of interlinkages within
the financial, energy, and food commodity markets; the problem could be extremely
relevant if excessive speculation is indeed a cause of extreme price spikes.
6.3.4 Financial Instruments
There are two major proposals linked to the use of financial instruments: (1)
the virtual reserves proposed by von Braun and Torero (2008, 2009a, b) and (2)
a toolbox of market-based risk management tools, such as physical or financial
commodity price hedges, insurance and guarantee instruments, and counter-cyclical
lending, which can play an important role in helping vulnerable countries mitigate
and manage the risks associated with excessive food price volatility. The toolbox
was proposed in the Paris G-20 meeting and is still in its planning stage.
The proposal of virtual reserves is a safeguard mechanism to manage risk through
the implementation of a virtual reserve which is backed by a financial fund and is
aimed at calming markets during extreme price volatility. The concept has been
widely used by central banks for inflation targeting and dirty flotation of the
exchange rates.
The virtual reserve concept incorporates a global market analysis unit (GMAU),
which has two functions. First, and perhaps most importantly, the GMAU is an early
warning mechanism based on a model [see Martins-Filho et al. (2010) for details
about the model] that forecasts changes in returns for key staple commodities in
the futures market and identifies when a price abnormality occurs or when a price
spike appears imminent. When this price abnormality happens, it means that the
realized return is an extreme value and there is a high probability that it will fall
under the 95th percentile return on the following day or days; on the other hand,
if the realized return remains over the 95th percentile, it could imply the formation
of a price spike. The announcement of a potential price spike alerts the market to a
higher likelihood of an intervention in the futures market, which will immediately
increase the discount rate of potential short-term investors. If there is evidence of
an emerging price spike despite this alert, the GMAU will indicate that returns are
significantly above their normal. Finally, an autonomous technical committee would
then decide whether to enter the futures market. This intervention would consist of
executing a number of progressive short sales (that is, selling a firm promise—a
futures contract—to deliver the commodity at a later date at a specified price) over
a specific time period in futures markets at a variety of market prices in different
futures months until futures prices and spot prices decline to levels within the
estimated price bands. The GMAU would recommend the price or series of prices
to be offered in the short sales.
130 M. Torero
This increase in the supply of short sales will reduce spot prices and should
help to significantly reduce extreme price volatility by reducing the probability
of abnormal returns. In other words, the intervention will create a backwardation
in the market (the situation in which, and the amount by which, the price of a
commodity for future delivery is lower than the spot price or a far-month future
delivery price is lower than a nearby month future delivery price). Reducing these
abnormal returns would minimize potential second-round effects (such as export
bans, export restrictions, or reduction of import tariffs), given that spot prices would
again become consistent with market fundamentals; therefore, lower spot prices
would not result in the accelerated use of available supplies. All futures contracts
will ultimately be settled either through liquidation by offsetting purchases or sales
(the vast majority of agricultural futures contracts are settled this way) or through
delivery of the actual physical commodity. In this respect, the virtual fund will
only stand for delivery if there is a need to realize the futures sales, in which
case the fund will be used to obtain the necessary grain supply to comply with
futures contract delivery requirements and calm the markets. Usually, this action
would not be necessary and the whole operation would remain virtual because
the signal will deter speculators from entering. Questions would remain about
the price, the amount of short sales, and the duration of the intervention in the
futures markets; answering these questions would require political consultation and
continuous market monitoring and research.
The innovative concept behind the virtual reserve is the early warning alert
system provided to markets and regulators. The presence of the system alone
is likely to deter short-term financial investors from entering this market; the
probability of a real intervention is minimal. Nonetheless, the committee must be
ready to trade grain when necessary and to assume the potential costs of buying
back contracts at a higher price than they were sold for. In that sense, a clear financial
commitment is needed to give the correct signal to the market. The size of the initial
commitment is still being studied. A comprehensive cost–benefit assessment of the
system must look beyond agricultural markets and also include food security and
poverty considerations.
The key advantages of the virtual reserve compared to a physical reserve are
that (1) it involves a signaling mechanism, (2) it does not put more stress on
commodity markets, (3) it does not incur the significant storage and opportunity
costs of a physical reserve, (4) it resolves the problem of the interlinkages between
the financial and the commodity markets, and (5) its effect on markets would be
minimal because it is only a signal.
There are some critics of the virtual reserve concept. First, some have questioned
whether rising futures prices actually lead to increased spot market prices; however,
several studies suggested that changes in the futures prices of certain commodities
generally lead to changes in spot prices.6 In addition, the recent analysis by Her-
nandez and Torero (2010) complements these earlier studies by examining causal
6See Garbade and Silber (1983); Brorsen et al. (1984); Crain and Lee (1996).
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relations in the current decade with a much more developed futures commodity
market. Their analysis used both linear and nonparametric Granger causality tests
and identified a causal link in all cases. The results indicated that spot prices are
generally discovered in futures markets. In particular, they found that changes in
futures prices in the markets analyzed led to changes in spot prices more often than
the reverse case. Thus, from a policy perspective, these findings support the viability
of implementing a global virtual reserve to address grain price abnormalities
through signals in the futures market and, if necessary, market assessment in the
exchange of futures.
Wright (2009) also argued that it would be difficult for the responsible parties to
be certain that markets are out of equilibrium and that the proposed interventions
would not do more harm than good under any given circumstances. In this sense,
the model developed by Martins-Filho et al. (2010) has made significant progress
toward the capacity to predict price abnormalities, as previously explained. There
has also been significant concern regarding the size of the financial funds necessary
to ensure the success of the signal given by the virtual reserve. In that respect, the
virtual reserve requires a coordinated commitment from the group of participating
countries. Each country needs to commit to supplying funds, if needed, for
intervention in grain markets; this does not imply effective expenditure. Therefore,
the resources needed are promissory rather than actual budget expenditures. Further
analyses are required to determine the size of this fund because commodity
futures markets allow for high levels of leverage. This commitment cannot be
compared with budgets allocated for R&D. First, it is a commitment rather than
an expenditure; second, the size of this commitment should be significant enough
to provide a strong signal to the market. It is noteworthy that similar activities have
been implemented by central banks, such as the dirty flotation of the US dollar, a
practice whereby the US central bank uses reserves to maintain the target limits
of appreciation or depreciation of the currency within a certain range. Finally,
there is also a question of the governance behind the virtual reserve mechanism.
Clearly, reaching an agreement on the arrangements of the virtual reserve would
not be easy and may require a high-level United Nations task force to analyze the
way forward. Yet similar institutional arrangements have been made in the past;
examples include the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the
Food Aid Convention (FAC), the IMF Cereal Import Facility, and the IEA. The
IFAD was established as an international financial institution in 1977 and was a
major outcome of the 1974 World Food Conference in response to the food crisis
of the early 1970s. The FAC, which was first signed in 1967 and have since been
renewed five times, is the only treaty under which the signatories have a legal
obligation to provide international development assistance.
With respect to the toolbox of risk-coping mechanisms, there are basically two
initiatives being implemented. First, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)’s
new Agriculture Price Risk Management (APRM) product will allow producers and
consumers to hedge against downside or upside price risk on a pilot basis by using
a financial intermediary with both global reach and expertise in Latin America.
Efforts to introduce the APRM product will be supported by two other financial
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intermediaries focusing on lower income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, North
Africa, and the Middle East. In addition, other multilateral and regional development
banks are exploring their interest in risk-sharing by using APRM facilities in order to
take advantage of APRM’s operational infrastructure. Nevertheless, as the literature
has pointed out, the pickup rate of these insurance tools and their cost effectiveness
still needs to be assessed. Second, the World Bank has developed a proposal to
facilitate governments’ access to risk management markets by providing assistance
in structuring and executing financial and physical commodity risk hedging, and
in building the legal/regulatory/technical capacity required for using these tools.
The impact and process of this mechanism need to be evaluated to ensure its
effectiveness, viability, and sustainability.
6.3.5 Regulatory Proposals
Since late 2005, a number of serious problems have plagued the futures and cash
markets for grains (corn, soybeans, and wheat). The most dominant problem is lack
of price convergence between cash and futures prices (see, for example, Garcia et al.
2014 and Adjemian et al. 2013). There seem to be several factors related to the
uncoupling of cash and futures prices. The first concerns delivery certificates, which
are issued by warehouses to those holding a long position in the futures market
until the contract expires. The problem in this case is that the parties holding long
positions are not using these certificates to take delivery but are holding them, in
part because of the value the certificates retain. The second problem is that actual
delivery is not occurring. Many market participants believe that the lack of load-out
is contributing to the lack of convergence in futures and cash prices. Because the
demand for delivery is diminished, storage facilities have less space available. This
raises a concern about storage rates, which should be reviewed to ensure that they are
kept at the right levels. An incorrect storage rate could contribute to the uncoupling
of cash and futures prices. Proposed solutions for the lack of price convergence
include changing the storage facility fees, changing the futures contract to a cash-
settled contract, changing the design of the delivery instrument, compelling load-out
(i.e., compelling entities with long positions to stand for delivery), and reviewing
trading patterns of fund traders to ascertain their effect on the market.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and other agencies of the
US government and the European Commission, along with the futures industry,
have reviewed proposals and implemented seasonal storage rates, limits on the
number of delivery certificates an entity can hold for noncommercial purposes, and
an additional issue of the Commitment of Traders report to increase transparency. If
these structural changes do not significantly improve the price convergence between
futures and cash prices, then a cash-settled contract must be seriously considered. In
any regard, exchanges and regulators cannot afford to continue pursuing solutions
at a slow pace. These problems began in late 2005, and so far very few structural
changes have occurred.
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Despite these regulatory measures being seemingly complementary to many
of the proposals described above, a major problem hindering any regulatory
mechanism in futures exchanges is the level of linkages between the main futures
commodity markets. If activities in different future exchanges mutually influence
each other, then regulations implemented in an exchange would merely transfer
the problem to another exchange; this again requires managing the complexity of
multicountry coordination, as in the case of the virtual reserve or any global or
regional reserves.
Possible solutions to address potential excessive speculation include imposing
stricter speculative limits and larger margins, phasing out existing position limit
waivers for index traders, imposing additional restrictions on index traders, investi-
gating index trading in other agricultural markets, and strengthening data collection
on index trading in nonagricultural markets.
To summarize the analysis of all proposed alternatives, Fig. 6.3 classifies the
major proposed initiatives based on their cost (horizontal axis) and their effec-
tiveness in reducing price volatility (vertical axis). It is important to mention that
only these two dimensions are used because the major objective of this chapter is
to identify the existing mechanisms proposed and their effectiveness in reducing
price volatility. In that respect, some of these initiatives, such as the emergency food
reserves (von Braun and Torero 2009a, b) and the food import facility (Sarris 2009),
have objectives other than reducing price volatility; therefore they were ranked
low in that dimension. This does not mean that they are ineffective in meeting
their core objective. On the other hand, policies such as the virtual reserves (von
Braun and Torero 2009a, b), the internationally coordinated grain reserves (Lin
2008), the regional reserves (such as the ASAEN), and the International Grain
Clearance Agreement (Sarris 2009) were ranked higher in terms of effectiveness in
reducing price volatility, although they vary significantly in the amount of resources
needed for their implementation and in the amount of additional research required
to implement them properly.
6.4 Conclusion
The international food price crises of 2007–2008 and 2010 led to economic
difficulties for the poor, generated political turmoil in many countries, and could
have severely affected confidence in global grain markets, thereby hampering the
market’s performance in responding to fundamental changes in supply, demand, and
the costs of production. More importantly, food crises could result in unreasonable
or unwanted price fluctuations, which could harm the poor and cause long-term,
irreversible damage to the body because of malnutrition, especially among children.
The food crises highlighted the need to modify the architecture of international
financial and agricultural markets in order to address the problem of price spikes.
Appropriate global institutional arrangements for preventing such market failures
are missing. A global solution to prevent excessive price volatility in food markets
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Fig. 6.3 Proposals for reducing price volatility. Note: The vertical axis refers to the potential effect
in reducing price volatility and the horizontal axis to the costs required for its implementation.
(1) ER D emergency reserve, von Braun and Torero (2009a, b), it requires US$7.5 Mpa but is
to alleviate requirements of WFP during food scarcity and not to reduce price volatility. (2)
ICGR D internationally coordinated grain reserves, Lin (2008), it implies opportunity costs and
coordination costs (approx. US$1.05 Bpa) and it could have an impact in reducing volatility but
high risks of coordination failure, requires capacity to predict price spikes, and not necessarily
effective to tackle speculation in futures market. Timmer (2010) proposes a similar idea only
for rice given how concentrated this market is we expect it to have a higher effect in reducing
volatility in this specific commodity. (3) RR D regional reserves as the one of ASEAN, it implies
opportunity costs and coordination costs; depending on the market share on the commodities
of the countries involved, it could have an impact in reducing volatility, but very high risks of
coordination failure, and could distort market prices, patronage problems, and other principal
agent problems. (4) CR D country level reserves, this could imply significant relative costs at the
country level, significant distortions, and little effect on volatility given low effect over international
markets. (5) VR D virtual reserves, von Braun and Torero (2009a, b), it requires US$12–20 B, risk
of coordination failure, requires capacity to predict price spikes, could be effective in tackling
speculation in futures market, requires certainty that markets are out of equilibrium to avoid
distortion of interventions. (6) DFIF D diversion from industrial and animal feed uses, Wright
(2009), it implies opportunity costs, could distort market efficiency, and necessarily effective
to tackle speculation in futures markets. (7) IS C IFA D better Information on Storage and
International Food Agency (Wright 2009), very low cost not clear effectiveness in reducing price
volatility (8) IGCA D International Grain Clearance Arrangement, Sarris (2009). Not too costly,
not clear how it will operate, not clear size of margins, not clear if it will work when stocks
are tight, and not necessarily effective to tackle speculation in futures markets. (9) FIFF D food
import financing facility, Sarris (2009). Similar to IMF’s food import facility, could be costly,
possible moral hazard problems, and not effective to tackle speculation in futures markets. (10)
EWM D early warning mechanism. (11) TF D trade facilitation—Wright (2009) and Lin (2008)
2007–2008 and 2010, such solution would still have large positive net returns.
Clearly, some of the key drivers behind the excessive price volatility can be
directly addressed by, for example, revising biofuel policies through curtailing
biofuel subsidies, making mandates flexible and liberalizing biofuel and feedstock
trade. Another way to address the problem is by increasing and diversify global
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productivity and production in order to raise the number of countries that export
staple foods and, at the same time, increase aggregate global reserves to the
minimum critical level needed.
On the other hand, the incentives for excessive financial activity in the food
commodity futures markets, which is one of the causes of price volatility, could be
reduced by (1) changing regulatory frameworks to limit the volume of speculation
versus hedging, (2) making delivery on contracts or portions of contracts compul-
sory, and (3) imposing capital deposit requirements on every futures transaction.
These regulatory measures could be implemented on a case-by-case basis or as a
platform through an international “alliance of commodity exchanges.” Therefore,
there is a need to discuss exchange regulation and the role of speculative traders,
and this discussion must include the issue of international harmonization of any
regulatory policy to increase the probability of successful policy implementation.
There is also a clear need to improve the quality of information on and forecasting
of price spikes for any of these potential policies to work properly. AMIS could be
an important option for addressing this issue.
Several of the proposals that are specifically for reducing price volatility or the
effects of the price crises require significant and quick investment in further research
into their implementation and potential risks and benefits. In addition, many of
them have different objectives and therefore could substantially complement each
other. For example, the following three proposals complement each other: (1)
von Braun and Torero’s (2009a) proposal of emergency humanitarian reserves
and a financial instrument to reduce the incentives for excessive speculation, (2)
Lin’s (2008) proposal of an international coordinated regional reserve,7 and (3)
Wright’s (2009) proposal of providing better information regarding storage and the
development of an international food agency. Moreover, the institutional design of
the virtual reserve concept included a specialized research unit that would not only
improve information regarding storage but also enhance the capacity of monitoring
the probability distribution of price spikes and the periods of excessive volatility
(similarly to what is being implemented through AMIS). While the proposed actions
will entail costs, the modest costs of the required organizational elements must be
balanced against the benefits of more effective international financial architecture.
The benefits include the prevention of economic hardship and political instability,
improved market efficiency, and stronger incentives for long-term investment in
agriculture.
All other proposals focused on different objectives and do not seem to have
the potential to significantly reduce price volatility; nevertheless, they may have
positive effects on other issues, such as trade financing (Sarris 2009) and the long-
term effects of some of the variables behind the changes in supply and demand
fundamentals (Wright 2009).
In the meantime, we observed a diverse set of policy actions being taken: many
countries try to build up costly national reserves, others focus on increasing self-
7See von Braun et al. (2009) for a joint proposal.
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sufficiency, and still others engage in FDI to secure national food security through
transnational land acquisition rather than trade because of lost confidence in trade
owing to uncertainty surrounding volatility. In addition, some countries are pressing
for more regulation of exchanges, which would not prevent extreme price spikes and
could even further distort markets. All of these policy actions threaten to move food
agriculture further away from efficient market designs. A more promising step may
be regional coordinated reserves, as recently planned by ASEAN. Nevertheless, a
global problem needs global institutional responses.
A clear message from all these proposals is that comprehensive research is
needed to provide the decision-making body with independent and trustworthy
information on possible alternatives for coping with the new global scenario of price
spikes and excessive price volatility. All of these alternatives would clearly benefit
from improved information availability. At the same time, improving information
availability would allow for better evaluation of the costs and benefits of each
proposal.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 2.5 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/) which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s)
and source are credited.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or
reproduce the material.
References
Adams R Jr (1983) The role of research in policy development: the creation of the IMF Cereal
import facility. World Dev 11(7):549–563
Adjemian MK, Garcia P, Irwin S, Smith A (2013) Non-convergence in domestic commodity
futures markets: causes, consequences, and remedies (no. 155381). United States Department
of Agriculture, Economic Research Service
Bakary S (2008) The new face of hunger. The Economist, 17 April
Bouet A, Laborde DD (2009) The potential cost of a failed Doha round. In: 12th annual conference
on global economic analysis, Santiago, Chile
Brahmbhatt M, Christiaensen L (2008) Rising food prices in East Asia: challenges and pol-
icy options. World Bank, Washington, DC. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/EA_Rising_Food_Prices050508.pdf
Brorsen BW, Bailey D, Richardson JW (1984) Investigation of price discovery and efficiency for
cash and futures cotton prices. West J Agric Econ 9(1):170–176
Calvo G (2008) Exploding commodity prices, lax monetary policy, and sovereign wealth funds.
VoxEU, 20 June
Crain S, Lee JH (1996) Volatility in wheat spot and futures markets, 1950–1993: government farm
programs, seasonality, and causality. J Finance 51(1):325–343
De Schutter O (2010) Food commodity speculation and food price crises, regulation to reduce the
risks of price volatility
Evans A (2009) The feeding of the nine billion: global food security for the 21st century. Chatham
House, London
6 Alternative Mechanisms to Reduce Food Price Volatility and Price. . . 137
FAO (1980) The state of food and agriculture 1980. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome
Food and Fuel Prices-Recent Developments, Macroeconomic Impact, and Policy Responses
Prepared by the Fiscal Affairs, Policy Development and Review, and Research Departments
(In consultation with other departments) Approved by Teresa Ter-Minassian, Mark Allen, and
Simon Johnson, available at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/063008.pdf
Galtier F (2009) How to manage food price instability in developing countries. Working paper, no.
5. Moisa
Garbade K, Silber W (1983) Price movements and price discovery in futures and cash markets.
Rev Econ Stat 65(2):289–297
Garcia P, Irwin SH, Smith A (2014) Futures market failure? Am J Agric Econ 97(1):40
Gilbert CL (1987) International commodity agreements: design and performance. World Dev
15(5):591–616
Gilbert CL (1996) International commodity agreements: an obituary notice. World Dev 24(1):1–19
Gilbert C (2010) How to understand high food prices. J Agric Econ (April 2010):1–28. Preliminary
online version
Headey D, Fan S (2010) Reflections on the global food crisis. How did it happen? How has it hurt?
And how can we prevent the next one, Research monograph 165. IFPRI, Washington, DC
Hernandez M, Torero M (2010) Examining the dynamic relationship between spot and futures
prices of agricultural commodities. Commodity Market Review 2009-2010, pp 47–87
HM Government (2010) The 2007/08 agricultural price spikes: causes and policy implications.
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, London. Available at http://www.defra.
gov.uk/foodfarm/food/pdf/ag-price100105.pdf
Huddleston B, Johnson GD, Reutlinger S, Valdés A (1984) International finance for food security.
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD
Irwin SH, Sanders DR, Merrin RP (2009a) Devil or angel? The role of speculation in the recent
commodity price boom (and bust). J Agric Appl Econ 41:393–402
Irwin SH, Garcia P, Good DL, Kunda EL (2009b) Poor convergence performance of CBOT corn,
soybean and wheat futures contracts: causes and solutions. Marketing and outlook research
report 2009–02, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, March 2009
Irwin S, Good D, Garcia P, Kunda E (2009c) Comments on Permanent Senate Subcommittee on
Investigations report ‘excessive speculation in the wheat market’. Department of Agricultural
and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois. July 2009. Available under ‘Miscellaneous
Publications’ at http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/irwin/research.html
Lin J (2008) Prepared remarks presented at the roundtable on ‘preparing for the next global food
price crisis’, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, 17 October 2008
Lipsky J (2008) Commodity prices and global inflation, remarks at the Council on Foreign
Relations, New York City, 8 May 2008
Martin W, Anderson K (2010) Trade distortions and food price surges. Paper for the World Bank-
UC Berkeley conference on agriculture for development—revisited, Berkeley, 1–2 Oct 2010
Martins-Filho C, Torero M, Yao F (2010) Estimation of quantiles based on nonlinear models of
commodity price dynamics and extreme value theory. IFPRI, Mimeo. Available at http://www.
foodsecurityportal.org/policy-analysis-tools/wheat-prices-and-returns
OECD (2008) Rising food prices: causes and consequences (OECD policy report). Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
54/42/40847088.pdf
Rashid S, Lemma S (2010) Strategic grain reserve in Ethiopia: institutional design and operational
performance. IFPR discussion paper 01054, January 2011, Washington, DC
Robles M, Cooke B (2009) Recent food prices movements: a time series analysis. Discussion paper
942. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC
Robles M, Torero M, von Braun J (2009) When speculation matters (Issue brief 57). International
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/ib/
ib57.asp
Rojas-Suarez L (2008) The right response in Latin America to oil and food price pressures: fight
inflation now! Center for Global Development, Washington, DC
138 M. Torero
Rosegrant MW, Zhu T, Msangi S, Sulser T (2008) The impact of biofuel production on world cereal
prices. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Unpublished paper,
quoted with permission, July 2008
Sanders DR, Irwin SH (2010) A speculative bubble in commodity futures prices? Cross-sectional
evidence. Agric Econ 41:25–32
Sarris A (2009) Hedging cereal import price risks and institutions to assure import supplies. FAO
working paper
Shaw DJ (2007) World food security: a history since 1945. Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Sommer M, Gilbert C (2006) The boom in nonfuel commodity prices: can it last? World Econ
Outlook 35:1–31, Chapter 5
Timmer CP (2010) Reflections on food crises past. Food Policy 35:1–11
UNCTAD (2009) World investment report 2009. Transnational corporations, agricultural produc-
tion and development, United Nations
Valdés A (ed) (1981) Food security for developing countries. A Westview special study. Westview,
Boulder, CO
von Braun J (2008a) Food summit: some progress but more needs to be done (Press statement
release, 6 June 2008). International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Available
at http://www.ifpri.org/pressrel/2008/20080606.asp
von Braun J (2008b) Biofuels, international food prices, and the poor (Testimony to the United
States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 12 June 2008). International Food
Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/testimony/
vonbraun20080612.asp#dl
von Braun J (2008c) Rising food prices: what should be done? (Policy brief, April 2008).
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.ifpri.
org/pubs/bp/bp001.asp
von Braun J, Torero M (2008) Physical and virtual global food reserves to protect the poor and
prevent market failure. Policy brief 4, June 2008. International Food Policy Research Institute,
Washington, DC. Available at http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/bp/bp004.pdf
von Braun J, Torero M (2009a) Implementing the physical and virtual food reserves to protect
the poor and prevent market failure. Policy brief 10, February 2009. International Food Policy
Research Institute, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/bp/bp010.pdf
von Braun J, Torero M (2009b) Exploring the price spike. Choices 24(1). Available at http://www.
choicesmagazine.org/magazine/article.php?article=58
von Braun J, Ahmed A, Okyere KA, Fan S, Gulati A, Hoddinott J et al (2008) High food prices:
the what, who, and how of proposed policy actions. Policy brief, May 2008. International
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.ifpri.org/PUBS/ib/
FoodPricesPolicyAction.pdf
von Braun J, Lin J, Torero M (2009) Eliminating drastic food price spikes—a three pronged
approach for reserves. Note for discussion
Wiggins S, Keats S (2009a) Volatile world food prices and their implications: grain stocks and
price spikes. Overseas Development Institute, London
Wiggins S, Keats S (2009b) Annex 2, Grain stocks and price spikes. Overseas Development
Institute, London
World Agricultural Outlook Board (2008) World agricultural supply and demand estimates.
WASDE-460, USDA, Washington, DC
Wright B (2008) Speculators, storage, and the price of rice. Giannini Foundation of Agricultural
Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA
Wright B (2009) International grain reserves and other instruments to address volatility in grain
markets. The World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 5028. August
Wright BD, Bobenrieth E (2009) The food price crisis of 2007/2008: evidence and implications.
Food outlook: global market analysis. FAO, Rome
